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Foreclosures and Neighborhoods:  
The Shape and Impacts of the  
U.S. Mor tgage Crisis
Dan Immergluck
T   he U.S. mortgage crisis beginning in 2007 resulted in very high levels of foreclosures in many neighborhoods around the country. In addition to harming individual households, foreclosures had negative spillover ef-
fects on nearby properties and households, including lower property values and 
higher crime rates. To understand the effects of foreclosures on households and 
neighborhoods, it is important first to understand the demographic and geo-
graphic distributions of foreclosures and how they may have changed during the 
foreclosure crisis, which persisted for more than five years, from 2007 to beyond 
2012. Spurred in part by the crisis, dozens of studies have been published on the 
effects of foreclosures on neighborhoods; somewhat fewer studies have systemati-
cally examined the intrametropolitan morphology of the crisis, including how this 
morphology varied across metropolitan areas and over time. This chapter first 
reviews the geographic incidence and concentrations of foreclosures, and then re-
views evidence of the impacts of foreclosures on households and neighborhoods.
The Racial and Spatial Dynamics of Subprime Lending  
and Foreclosures   
Lending Patterns by race and sPace
With the rise of the subprime mortgages in the 1990s, the problems of discrimi-
nation and redlining in mortgage markets evolved into a new shape and scale. 
While basic access to institutional mortgage credit remained an issue, the rise of 
high-risk subprime lenders created wider problems in the pricing and terms of 
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mortgages. Some of the earliest work documenting the segmentation of the mort-
gage market across race and space came from Chicago, the birthplace of Com-
munity Reinvestment Act activism. This research showed that the number of 
refinance loans made in predominantly black neighborhoods grew almost thirty-
fold from 1993 to 1998, while subprime refinance loans in predominantly white 
neighborhoods grew by about twofold (Immergluck and Wiles 1999). By 1998, 
the largest lenders in predominantly black neighborhoods were specialized sub-
prime firms, while the top originators in predominantly white neighborhoods 
were prime lenders. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) analyzed lending patterns in the United States, paying 
special attention to five large cities, and found that subprime lenders dominated 
black neighborhoods (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
2000). Later analyses continued to document segmented home loan markets in 
cities throughout the country, finding that subprime lending was disproportion-
ately concentrated in minority neighborhoods (Bradford 2002; Scheessele 2002). 
Scheessele (2002) and Immergluck (2004) both found that the racial composition 
of a neighborhood was strongly associated with the concentration of subprime 
lending, even after they accounted for other neighborhood housing and economic 
characteristics.
In the aftermath of the 1990s subprime boom, researchers also found that 
the race of the borrower had a significant effect on the likelihood of him or her 
receiving a subprime versus a prime loan, even after they controlled for credit 
history and other variables. For example, a study of home loans conducted by 
an affiliate of the Mortgage Bankers Association found that the probability of a 
borrower receiving a subprime loan increased by approximately one-third when 
the borrower was black, even when controlling for credit history, location, and 
other variables (Pennington-Cross, Yezer, and Nichols 2000).
Additional research has documented the relationship between race and sub-
prime lending during the 2000s. Based on calculations of researchers at the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, figure 7.1 shows the differences among whites, Hispanics, 
and blacks in their likelihood of receiving subprime loans in 2006, at the height 
of the subprime boom (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner 2007). For the United States 
as a whole, more than 53 percent of black home buyers and more than 52 per-
cent of blacks refinancing their homes received subprime loans. Moreover, black 
home buyers were three times more likely to receive a subprime loan than white 
home buyers. Even when researchers adjusted for variations in subprime inci-
dence due to differences in income, loan size, metropolitan statistical area, gen-
der, and the presence of a co-applicant, they found that most of this differential 
persisted, with the adjusted rate for blacks still being about 2.7 times the rate 
for whites. Almost half of Hispanic home buyers in 2006 also received subprime 
loans. While the difference between Hispanics and whites declined somewhat 
after researchers controlled for these factors, the adjusted differential remained 
sizable, at approximately 2 to 1.
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Similarly, Wyly and Ponder (2011) reported large disparities in the likelihood 
of different racial and ethnic groups receiving subprime loans. For example, they 
found that in 2006, single black women were more than four times as likely to 
receive subprime loans as white couples and more than three times as likely to 
receive subprime loans as single white women.
Faber (2013) examined home purchase loans that originated nationally in 
2006, controlling for borrower income, neighborhood racial and income compo-
sition, regional and metropolitan location, and the presence of a co-applicant. He 
found that blacks and Hispanics were 2.4 times more likely to receive subprime 
loans than whites. Moreover, Faber determined that higher-income blacks and 
Hispanics were more likely to receive subprime loans than lower-income minori-
ties, while higher-income whites were less likely to receive subprime loans than 
lower-income whites. Some of this difference may have been due to higher property 
values associated with higher-income versus lower-income minority homeowners. 
Figure 7.1
High-Cost (Subprime) Lending Incidence by Race of Borrower, 2006 (%)
White
Hispanic, adjusted for borrower
characteristics
Hispanic
Black, adjusted for borrower
characteristics
Black
Figure 7.1
Lincoln_McCarthy_Land and the City
Percentage of loans that were high-cost
Refinance loans Home purchase loans
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Note: Adjusted for income, loan size, presence of co-applicant, metropolitan statistical area, and gender. 
Source: Data from Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007).
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Moreover, higher-income whites may have been better served by prime financial 
institutions than higher-income minorities, leaving them less vulnerable to aggres-
sive subprime lenders.
The racial patterns of subprime lending were also present at a spatial level, as 
predominantly minority neighborhoods were much more likely to see high levels 
of subprime loans than other neighborhoods. Kingsley and Pettit (2009) found 
that the density of subprime loans at a neighborhood level was highest in black 
and Hispanic neighborhoods during the subprime boom period, from 2004 to 
2006. They also found that the highest subprime densities were in relatively low-
poverty, high-minority neighborhoods. This finding might be related to the rela-
tively higher-value housing stock in lower-poverty census tracts.
Mayer and Pence (2008) focused on the spatial distribution of subprime 
lending in 2005. Using loan data from Loan Performance (now known as Core-
Logic), they found that subprime lending in predominantly black and Hispanic 
zip codes was much higher than in other areas, even after controlling for credit 
scores and other economic characteristics of the zip codes. Similarly, Calem, Her-
shaff, and Wachter (2010), analyzing home loans in seven major cities in 1997 
and 2002, found that blacks were more likely than whites to receive subprime 
loans, even after controlling for borrower income and a variety of neighborhood 
characteristics, including educational level and average credit score.
Gruenstein-Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2008) were among the first to combine 
publicly available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data (including data 
on borrowers’ race and income) with private data from a major loan data ven-
dor (including information on loan terms and credit quality). They found that 
African American home buyers were 31 percent more likely to receive a high-rate 
fixed-rate mortgage with a prepayment penalty than white borrowers with simi-
lar loan and personal characteristics, including similar credit scores.
Gruenstein-Bocian et al. (2011) found that racial disparities in receiving sub-
prime loans during the peak of the subprime boom were actually greater among 
borrowers with higher credit scores. This was consistent with an earlier, well-
publicized analysis by the Wall	 Street	 Journal suggesting that many subprime 
borrowers could have qualified for prime loans based on their credit scores 
(Brooks and Simon 2007). These studies added to concerns that there had been 
systematic—and perhaps intentional—steering of minorities toward higher-cost 
and riskier subprime loans.1 In particular, Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007) 
found that the probability of receiving a subprime loan was heavily dependent 
on the particular lending channel through which the borrower received the loan. 
1. Consumer advocates argued that yield-spread premiums, in particular, encouraged mort-
gage brokers to steer borrowers toward high-cost loans. A disproportionate level of mortgage 
broker activity in minority communities and/or a higher vulnerability to such steering among 
minority borrowers could have contributed to the prevalence of minorities who had good 
credit receiving subprime loans.
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For example, in comparing the customers of a traditional prime lending unit and 
a specialized subprime lending unit owned by the same financial firm, they found 
that a borrower receiving a loan through the subprime channel was much more 
likely to receive a subprime loan (even if he or she could qualify for a prime 
loan—a loan that the lender could make or could help the borrower obtain) than 
a similar borrower obtaining a loan via the prime lending channel. The channel 
that the borrower happens to enter the parent firm through (often due to market-
ing from one unit or the other) determines the pricing and terms of credit, rather 
than the qualifications of the borrower.
Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia combined HMDA 
data with information from a national proprietary data set on loan and borrower 
characteristics for three states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware) from 
1999 to 2007 (Smith and Hevener 2014). As in the work of Gruenstein-Bocian 
and associates (Gruenstein-Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2008; Gruenstein-Bocian et al. 
2011), combining HMDA data with loan-level data on borrower credit scores 
and loan terms provided a rich, multivariate, loan-level analysis. Smith and Heve-
ner (2014) found that blacks had a high probability of receiving subprime versus 
prime loans during all years studied. They also estimated the difference in the 
likelihood of whites and blacks receiving subprime loans due to factors other 
than race, including income, credit score, neighborhood characteristics, and loan 
characteristics, among others. At most, these factors explained only two-thirds 
of the higher likelihood of blacks receiving subprime loans in 2005. This left one-
third of the difference due solely to race, suggesting the likelihood of discrimina-
tory forces in determining who received subprime loans. Researchers in other 
locations using data sets containing information on loan terms and credit scores 
found similar results (Courchane 2007; Reid and Laderman 2009).
ForecLosure Patterns by race and sPace
Minority homeowners were disproportionately impacted by foreclosures, espe-
cially in the earlier years of the crisis, when subprime loans accounted for the 
bulk of the problem. Gruenstein-Bocian, Li, and Ernst (2010) analyzed foreclo-
sures between 2007 and 2009, at the height of the initial, subprime phase of the 
foreclosure crisis. They estimated that owner-occupied homes accounted for ap-
proximately 80 percent of all foreclosures and that black and Hispanic homeown-
ers were disproportionately impacted. Figure 7.2 presents some of the findings 
from their study. Almost 8 percent of first mortgages to black homeowners that 
originated between 2005 and 2008—the height of the subprime lending boom—
went into foreclosure between 2007 and 2009, compared with only 4.5 percent 
for whites. That means the black foreclosure rate was 76 percent greater than 
the white rate. Similarly, the foreclosure rate for Hispanic homeowners was 
7.7 percent, or 71 percent greater than the white rate. Even so, because whites 
accounted for a majority of borrowers during that time, they also accounted for 
more than half of all foreclosures. Blacks and Hispanics together accounted for 
about 28 percent of foreclosures, with Asians and other ethnicities accounting 
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for the remaining portion. Yet while the subprime crisis disproportionately af-
fected black and Hispanic homeowners, it was not confined to people of color, 
even in the early stages. Later, as foreclosures spread to the prime market and 
consequently to a broader set of middle-income and majority-white communi-
ties, whites accounted for an even larger portion of foreclosures in most regions.
During the foreclosure crisis, media reports fluctuated between describing 
foreclosures as primarily affecting central city neighborhoods (Whitehouse 2007) 
and describing them as being concentrated in newer suburban or exurban areas 
(Farrell 2008). The evidence on the intrametropolitan distribution of the crisis is 
somewhat more complicated than either of these simplistic narratives would sug-
gest, with many inner-city neighborhoods and many newly developed suburban 
areas both being hit hard. This dichotomy was driven in large part by the op-
portunistic nature of the subprime mortgage boom. High-risk credit flowed dis-
proportionately both into vulnerable inner-city neighborhoods, where mortgage 
brokers aggressively marketed home loans, especially refinance loans, and into 
newly developing suburban and exurban communities, where home ownership 
was attainable but perhaps not always sustainable, especially in the event of eco-
nomic hardships.
Figure 7.2
Foreclosure Rates for Owner-Occupied Homes by Race and Ethnicity, 2007–2009
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Source: Gruenstein-Bocian, Li, and Ernst (2010).
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Due to differences in the geography of housing, income, and race among 
metropolitan areas, as well as to differences in the penetration of the subprime 
lending industry from city to city, the neighborhood distribution of foreclosures 
varied a good deal across metropolitan areas. Which neighborhoods were hit 
hardest by the crisis depended on the particular economic and housing geography 
of the metropolitan area. More specifically, the incidence and concentration of 
foreclosures depended not only on the spatial determinants of default and fore-
closure but also on the geographic distribution of subprime and high-risk loans. 
Immergluck (2010a) showed that in many older industrial metropolitan areas 
with traditionally weaker economies and housing markets, such as Detroit and 
Cleveland (but also some cities with stronger regional economies, including At-
lanta and Chicago), subprime delinquencies and foreclosures had been increasing 
well before 2007. By the first quarter of 2006, subprime delinquency rates had 
already exceeded 12 percent not only in states with more troubled economies, 
such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, but also in states such as 
Georgia and Tennessee. Until late 2006, regions with very hot housing markets 
experienced low delinquency rates, with California, Arizona, and Nevada hav-
ing subprime delinquency below 6 percent. This was partly due to the fact that 
borrowers struggling with their mortgages in hot markets could avoid default or 
foreclosure by quickly refinancing or selling their homes. By the summer of 2007, 
however, after appreciation had stalled in most places, delinquency and foreclo-
sure rates were accelerating in most large metropolitan areas, with the steepest 
increases in markets where housing values were also rapidly declining.
As discussed earlier, subprime lending was disproportionately concentrated 
among minority homeowners, so higher levels of subprime foreclosures could be 
expected to occur in predominantly minority neighborhoods, which comprise 
many inner-city communities. At the same time, subprime and high-risk lend-
ing also helped fuel rapid growth in newer suburban and exurban communities, 
especially in parts of the Southwest, California, and Florida (Ong and Pfeiffer 
2008; Schafran and Wegman 2012; Schildt et al. 2013). Some media reports and 
commentary, however, portrayed the crisis as one exclusively centered in a new 
“slumburb” and ignored the fact that it was also heavily concentrated in many 
older urban neighborhoods (Leinberger 2008).
One of the few studies of neighborhood-level foreclosure patterns across a 
wide variety of metropolitan areas examined changes in the prevalence of fore-
closed properties at the zip code level in 75 large metropolitan areas (Immergluck 
2010b). This study analyzed the share of single-family properties (including town-
homes and condominiums) that had been foreclosed on and repossessed by lend-
ing institutions, instead of measuring foreclosures by comparing foreclosures with 
housing units. Many other estimates of foreclosure prevalence have effectively 
assumed that each housing unit equates to a “mortgageable” property, a grossly 
inaccurate assumption in neighborhoods with many multifamily rental units.
Based on an earlier study (Immergluck 2010a), U.S. metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) were classified into three categories of foreclosure activity. Type 1 
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metros were those in which housing prices had remained relatively stable and 
foreclosure levels had not been large prior to the advent of the crisis in 2007. 
Type 2 metros were mostly older metropolitan areas where foreclosures had al-
ready reached relatively high levels before the crisis. Type 3 metros were the 
“boom-bust” areas that had very low foreclosure rates before 2007 but began 
experiencing sharp declines in housing prices after 2006. Figure 7.3 shows the 
locations of the three types of metros. Type 1 metros were scattered across the 
country and included most smaller metropolitan areas and many areas in the Great 
Plains and Rocky Mountain regions, where the crisis tended to be less severe. 
Type 2 metros included most larger metropolitan areas in the upper Midwest, as 
well as some (mostly larger) metros in Colorado and the Southeast. Type 3 met-
ros were clustered in California, Florida, and Nevada (including Las Vegas) and 
Arizona (including Phoenix), as well as along the East Coast.
Regression results showed that from 2006 to 2008, zip codes in MSAs with 
falling median home values experienced substantial increases in foreclosed prop-
erties, even after controlling for a wide variety of other differences in housing 
market conditions and local foreclosure processes. Greater increases in unem-
ployment also resulted in greater increases in foreclosures.
The prevalence of outstanding subprime mortgages in 2006 was a strong 
predictor of increases in foreclosure rates. For every 1 percent increase in the 
share of subprime mortgages, the number of foreclosed properties increased by 
4 percent on average over the following two years. The number of junior—or 
subordinate—mortgages outstanding at the end of 2006 was also positively asso-
ciated with the growth in the number of foreclosures from 2006 to 2008. Another 
key finding was that, other things being equal, zip codes with large numbers of 
recently constructed homes experienced greater increases in foreclosures. This 
may be due to the fact that large shares of homes in such areas were financed 
during the peak of the subprime boom. At the same time, zip codes with higher 
poverty rates experienced more foreclosures. In sum, the findings confirmed that 
the subprime foreclosure crisis was concentrated both in higher-poverty (often 
inner-city) neighborhoods and in many newer, sprawling communities.
Further analysis showed that neighborhood-level foreclosure patterns varied 
across the two types of metropolitan areas that experienced the brunt of the 
crisis—Type 2 and Type 3 metros. In general, Type 3 metros tended to see more 
suburbanized foreclosure patterns, especially when central city neighborhoods 
were relatively affluent, such as in San Diego and San Francisco. In addition, un-
employment was a bigger driver of increased foreclosures in Type 2 versus Type 
3 cities, which is consistent with the notion that foreclosures in many Type 2 
communities may have been driven more by weaknesses in the broader economy 
than was the case in Type 3 areas, where overheated housing markets fueled by 
subprime credit were rapidly deflating. Finally, and important, the results showed 
that neighborhoods with newer housing in Type 3 metros were particularly vul-
nerable to increased foreclosures, which is consistent with the idea that areas 
that experienced high levels of subprime lending near the peak of the boom also 
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experienced particularly high levels of foreclosures. This occurred in Type 2 met-
ros as well, but not to the same degree.
Schildt et al. (2013) examined the extent of the foreclosure crisis in suburban 
areas of the 100 largest U.S. metros. Their findings were generally consistent with 
those of Immergluck (2010b): suburban mortgage distress was highest in boom-
bust metros, especially in inland California and Florida, while suburban areas in 
older industrial cities were not hit as hard. This reflects the distribution of sub-
prime lending in 2004–2008, as these loans were also likely to be more available 
in suburban and exurban areas of boom-bust metros.
the suburbanization oF the ForecLosure crisis over time
As the subprime foreclosure crisis triggered the Great Recession, and as the mort-
gage and housing markets became weaker, many homeowners with well-priced, 
well-structured prime home loans began to find themselves in mortgage distress. 
Many lost their jobs due to the recession, especially those working in industries 
and regions that were vulnerable to the crash of the real estate market and, later, 
the broader economy. By 2010, with housing prices having declined significantly 
in most major metropolitan areas and many homeowners’ equity having been 
eroded by mounting declines in home values, millions of prime borrowers found 
Figure 7.4
The Suburban Share of Foreclosure Filings for Three Major Metropolitan Counties, 2007 and 2010
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themselves underwater on their mortgages (that is, their homes were worth less 
than they owed on their mortgages). As a result, any substantial economic shock, 
such as a job loss or health issue, could lead to foreclosure. In the meantime, an in-
creasing share of subprime borrowers had already lost their homes, so that the share 
of foreclosures associated with subprime loans began to decrease over time.
Figure 7.4 demonstrates that in three major urban counties—Fulton (At-
lanta), Cuyahoga (Cleveland), and Cook (Chicago)—the number of foreclosure 
filings (or notices) that occurred in the suburban parts of the counties grew sig-
nificantly over a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to 2010. The sub-
urban share grew the most, from 39 percent to just over 56 percent, in Fulton 
County, where there are many working-class suburbs to the south of Atlanta. 
Over the same period, the suburban share grew from 47 percent to 60 percent in 
Cuyahoga County and from 46 percent to 53 percent in Cook County.
The Impacts and Costs of Foreclosure and the  
Foreclosure Crisis   
The mortgage crisis brought financial pain to millions of American households. 
It uprooted families from neighborhoods and social networks, forced kids to 
change schools in the middle of the year, and created strains on mental and physi-
cal health, which in some cases triggered additional financial hardships. The costs 
of the crisis went well beyond impacts on borrowers, significantly affecting local 
property values and causing vacancy and blight, as well as the crime that often 
follows. As property values deteriorated, neighbors saw the equity in their homes 
decline, which made them more susceptible to foreclosure, as homes became 
harder to sell or refinance. This section describes the literature on the harms that 
arose due to mortgage distress and foreclosure. Not addressed are the wider mac-
roeconomic effects of the foreclosure crisis, which catalyzed the Great Recession 
and the global financial crisis.
direct harms to ForecLosed househoLds
Foreclosure has direct effects on households and individuals. Perhaps most ob-
vious is the loss of the home itself and the need to relocate, often quickly and 
under far-from-optimal conditions. Of course, beyond this is the potential loss of 
wealth if the family had built up significant equity in the home. As suggested ear-
lier in this chapter, the foreclosure crisis especially spurred losses in home equity 
and decreased home ownership rates among people and communities of color.
Figure 7.5 shows that the net worth of households declined substantially from 
2007 to 2011 and that the loss of wealth varied significantly across demographic 
groups. This was due to variations in decreases in home values and to the fact 
that the stock market, which generally constitutes a larger share of the household 
wealth of higher-income, older, and nonminority households, recovered signifi-
cantly from 2008 to 2011, while home values in many places did not.
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As figure 7.5 indicates, whereas white and Asian households lost 38 percent 
of their net worth from 2007 to 2011, households that were not white or Asian 
lost 71 percent of their net worth. This difference reflects the disproportion-
ate concentration of subprime loans among black and Hispanic homeowners. 
Households in the 35- to 54-year-old range also lost far greater shares of their 
wealth than older households—61 percent of their net worth compared with 
25 percent for those age 65 or older. Some of this difference is likely due to the 
geography and timing of home buying among the younger age group, especially 
those purchasing homes in boom-bust areas, where values were temporarily 
boosted by the surge in subprime and high-risk lending.
The foreclosure crisis forced many families out of home ownership and into 
the rental market. Certainly, home ownership is not the best form of tenure for all 
families at all times. However, in many places in the United States and especially 
for families with children, home ownership—if responsibly financed—can bring 
Figure 7.5
Changes in Real Net Worth by Demographic Group, 2007–2011 (%)
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significant benefits compared with renting. It can provide a sense of stability and 
control, allowing for predictable and relatively fixed housing costs (especially as-
suming access to a long-term, fixed-rate mortgage), and it can give families more 
neighborhood options, including those with strong schools. Moreover, rapid de-
clines in home ownership rates could have negative impacts on neighborhoods 
in which it may have helped provide more stability to the area.
While home ownership rates overall declined somewhat moderately from its 
peak in late 2004 and early 2005, the decline among certain demographic groups 
was significantly greater. From 2005 to 2012, the home ownership rate for blacks 
declined more than 5.5 percentage points, whereas it dropped only 2.5 percent-
age points for whites (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2013). Consistent with 
the loss-of-wealth figures cited earlier, the home ownership rate of households 
ages 25–44 fell almost 8.5 percentage points, while it stayed essentially flat for 
those age 65 and older. Finally, as with the wealth figures, families with children 
were hit particularly hard: married couples with children saw home ownership 
decline 7 percentage points, compared with married couples without children, 
who saw a decline of less than 2 percentage points.
Foreclosure has a direct impact on creditworthiness. Brevoort and Cooper 
(2010) found that the credit scores of prime and near-prime borrowers who had 
gone through foreclosure during the early years of the crisis dropped by 170–200 
points compared with their predelinquency scores. They moved rapidly into be-
coming subprime borrowers. Moreover, it generally takes many years for credit 
scores to rebound. Even seven years after a foreclosure, scores tend to remain 
50–75 points below where they were before foreclosure, despite the fact that the 
foreclosure can no longer be considered in calculating scores.
Lower credit scores have critical implications in an age when they are used 
by employers in evaluating job applicants, landlords in assessing potential ten-
ants, and insurance companies in underwriting and pricing automobile insur-
ance. According to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), any firm that delivers 
a good or service prior to receiving payment is effectively acting as a creditor 
and is allowed access to credit reports and scores. Utilities providing electricity, 
water, gas, phone, or cable TV often use credit bureau data. As early as 2002, 
TransUnion, one of the three large credit bureaus, reported that banks and credit 
unions had been overtaken as the largest users of credit data in the Philadelphia 
region by nonbank entities such as hospitals, telecommunication firms, and utili-
ties (Furletti 2002).
A substantial drop in credit scores, such as that caused by a foreclosure, has 
the potential to create a web of barriers to employment, quality housing, and 
basic goods and services. For example, the bulk of auto insurers use credit scores 
in underwriting and pricing new policies, although some states prohibit this prac-
tice (Hartwig and Wilkinson 2003). In many lower-income neighborhoods, auto 
insurance rates are already high, so a lower credit score may make use of an au-
tomobile prohibitively expensive, which in turn could limit employment oppor-
tunities. As landlords have increasingly relied on credit scores, postforeclosure 
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households needing rental housing may have been excluded from the full array 
of housing choices. Given the scarcity of affordable, decent rental housing in 
many metropolitan areas, this could make quality housing even more difficult to 
obtain. Compounding the damage of a lower credit score is the fact that employ-
ers have increasingly turned to credit data in screening job applicants. In a survey 
of more than 500 human resource managers, the Society for Human Resource 
Management (2012) found that 47 percent of employers used credit background 
checks in making hiring decisions.
Beyond direct financial and economic harm, the foreclosure crisis forced some 
children to change schools. Especially when this happens in the middle of the 
school year, it can stunt academic achievement, an effect that can last for years. 
In a study of Minneapolis during 2006–2007, Allen (2013) found that more than 
90 percent of households moved after a foreclosure, with most changing neigh-
borhoods and almost a third leaving the Minneapolis Public Schools district en-
tirely. In a similar study of students in New York City, Been et al. (2011) found 
that students living in properties that went through a foreclosure were likely to 
move to a different, lower-performing school. And in a study of the San Diego 
school system during 2001–2010, Dastrup and Betts (2012) found that the math 
test scores and attendance rates of children in owner-occupied homes declined in 
the year following a mortgage default and that these effects persisted after they 
controlled for a wide variety of student and school characteristics.
While direct evidence on the effects of foreclosure on children continues 
to emerge, there is already a large body of literature on the effects of residen-
tial instability that can help us understand the costs that foreclosure imposes 
on families. Sandstrum and Huerta (2013) reviewed much of the literature and 
found that “the experience of abrupt or frequent residential moves is stressful for 
children since it requires them to detach themselves from what they know and 
adapt to new surroundings” (29). They documented the considerable evidence 
that chaotic environments can have negative effects on children, including their 
scholastic outcomes. One longitudinal study of children from birth through age 
nine, which controlled for a large number of demographic characteristics, found 
that moving two or more times during the first two years of life increased the 
incidence of problems such as anxiety, sadness, and withdrawal at age nine (Rum-
bold et al. 2012). Another study found that moving before age four led to in-
creased problem behaviors at that age, even after controlling for child and family 
characteristics (Taylor and Edwards 2012).
In a longitudinal study of almost 5,000 children born in 20 large cities be-
tween 1998 and 2000, Ziol-Guest and McKenna (2013) found that children who 
moved three or more times in the first five years of life had greater attention 
problems than those who did not move; this difference remained significant after 
they controlled for a large number of demographic and household characteris-
tics. High levels of mobility also resulted in negative behavioral problems, and the 
magnitude of the effect was larger than that for any other independent variable, 
including race, ethnicity, parental education, and family structure, among others.
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In particular, residential instability has been shown to affect school perfor-
mance adversely. Taylor and Edwards (2012) found that five-year-olds who had 
moved five or more times since birth had vocabulary scores 41 percent of a stan-
dard deviation below average. Other studies have demonstrated that residential 
instability tends to result in lower grades, lower high school graduation rates, and 
lower adult educational attainment (Adams and Chase-Lansdale 2002; Coulton, 
Theodos, and Turner 2009; Sell et al. 2010; Ziol-Guest and Kalil 2013).
Studies in two different cities (Chicago and Baltimore) found similar effects 
of school transfers on academic achievement (Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber 
1996; Temple and Reynolds 1999). For each school transfer, achievement scores 
declined by approximately one month of school, even after the researchers con-
trolled for other factors. In a meta-analysis of the literature, Reynolds, Chen, and 
Herbers (2009), controlling for demographic and family characteristics, found 
that school mobility reduced reading and math achievement, as well as high school 
dropout rates. They also found that the negative effects of mobility increased with 
each additional move, with effects during the early elementary and high school 
years having the largest negative impacts on learning outcomes.
In some of the earliest research on the relationship between foreclosure and 
health, Fields et al. (2007) studied 88 families going through foreclosure in five 
cities around the country. They found that those families incurred a wide range 
of attendant hardships and emotional difficulties, including harm to children’s 
physical and mental health and trouble with their finances and credit histories. 
Many respondents felt shame, which sometimes discouraged them from seeking 
support services or even assistance from friends and family. According to Fields 
et al. (2007), foreclosure harmed family stability and made it difficult for families 
to make long-term plans. In some cases, foreclosure represented a “cascading 
series of economic and emotional losses that interfere with people’s day-to-day 
lives.” Many respondents took on additional employment to try to resolve delin-
quencies. More broadly, foreclosure sometimes led to increases in “fear, tension, 
and stress” among family members.
Foreclosure has been found to be closely associated with poor health among 
all family members. Because foreclosure can be both the result of poor health (and 
its associated expenses and loss of employment) and a potential cause, it is often 
difficult to determine the causal role it might play. A study in Philadelphia found 
that clients of a mortgage counseling agency who were undergoing foreclosure 
had high rates of depression, hypertension, and heart disease (Pollack and Lynch 
2009). Overall, almost 37 percent of these clients suffered from major depres-
sion. In a study of hospital visits and foreclosures in four states, Currie and Tekin 
(2011) found that a spike in neighborhood foreclosures was associated with sig-
nificant increases in unscheduled hospital visits, even after controlling for changes 
in unemployment, housing prices, migration, and other factors.
Longitudinal data allow for more precise measurement of the causal effects 
of foreclosure on physical and mental health. Alley et al. (2011) examined the re-
sults of a national longitudinal survey of adults over age 50 during the 2006–2008 
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period. Even after controlling for a wide variety of demographic, financial, and 
health variables, they found that mortgage delinquency was a strong predictor 
of negative changes in physical and mental health. Delinquent borrowers were 
almost eight times as likely to develop elevated depression compared with non-
delinquent borrowers. They were also almost eight times as likely to develop 
food insecurity and almost nine times as likely to develop cost-related medication 
nonadherence.
Foreclosure and residential instability may be particularly hard on the elderly 
or near-elderly. The elderly can be especially adversely affected by forced reloca-
tions (Danermark and Ekstrom 1990; Smith and Ferryman 2006). Seniors may 
be particularly dependent on social networks and relationships for their day-to-
day living circumstances and may be emotionally and psychologically less resil-
ient to involuntary stressors and changes.
costs to neighborhoods and communities
Foreclosures can impose economic and social costs on surrounding neighbor-
hoods and larger communities. Because housing is such a large part of the econ-
omy, home values have a direct effect on household wealth and expenditures, 
and mortgage market problems can—especially in less regulated environments—
spread rapidly to broader credit and capital markets. High levels of foreclosures 
across the country can also trigger major problems in national and international 
financial and employment markets (Levitin and Wachter 2013). The focus here, 
however, is on neighborhood and local effects.
Foreclosure might lower not only the value of the foreclosed home but also 
the value of nearby homes, which in turn can result in lower property tax collec-
tions and attendant fiscal stress. The mechanisms through which this can happen 
have generally been disaggregated into three types. First, foreclosures represent 
an increase in housing supply, and especially if they increase quickly, they can ef-
fectively create a “supply shock” in a neighborhood housing submarket, putting 
downward pressure on prices.
Second, the discounted prices at which foreclosed homes tend to sell may 
change the nature of comparable sales used by home buyers and appraisers to 
determine the value of available homes. If foreclosures become a sizable share of 
home sales, as they often did in hard-hit neighborhoods during the foreclosure 
crisis, and there are few traditional “arms-length” sales in an area not involving 
banks or servicers, appraisers may be effectively forced to consider real estate 
owned (REO) sales in the appraisal process (especially if the most comparable 
sales available over the past few months were those of foreclosed properties). 
In many distressed neighborhoods during the peak of the crisis, there were few 
comparable sales that did not involve at least one foreclosed property.
Finally, foreclosed homes are often vacant and may be dilapidated. Both va-
cancy and dilapidation can act as disamenities that deter buyers (Hartley 2011). 
Especially during times when home buyer demand is already weak, having one 
or two (or more) vacant, and sometimes boarded-up, properties on a block may 
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discourage the scarce buyers active in a market from purchasing in that neighbor-
hood. Research has shown that foreclosed homes tend to be in worse condition 
than owner-occupied properties. In a study of property complaints in the city 
of Boston from 2008 to 2012, Lambie-Hanson (2013) found that the typical 
single-family property was more than nine times as likely to receive a complaint 
from the public while in bank ownership (after foreclosure) as when the previ-
ous owner was current on his or her mortgage. Moreover, merely the presence of 
a vacant home nearby can increase owners’ (and potential buyers’) uncertainty 
about the trajectory of home values on the block.
In comments on an earlier version of this chapter, Jim Follain (2014) wisely 
pointed out a fourth mechanism for the effect on nearby homes that has received 
less attention in the literature. If higher foreclosure rates in a neighborhood trigger 
high-risk premiums among mortgage lenders, these higher premiums might lower 
the price buyers are willing or able to pay for homes in the area. Of course, this 
mechanism depends on the extent of pricing differentials triggered by perceived risks 
due to foreclosures. In lending environments in which risk-based pricing is more 
common, more severe, and more geographically specific, the proximate impacts of 
foreclosures on nondistressed home values would be expected to be greater.
The disamenity mechanism has been the most widely suggested of the mech-
anisms outlined here. Foreclosures that lead to vacant properties may become 
havens for criminal activity, which in turn can depress property values even more. 
As values decline in a neighborhood, more and more homeowners become un-
derwater, making it difficult or impossible to sell their properties and forcing 
more homeowners into foreclosure, thus creating a vicious cycle of foreclosures 
and declines in value. Foreclosures can also spur rapid neighborhood change by 
forcing out longtime residents and in some cases allowing irresponsible investors 
or speculators to move in.
Immergluck and Smith (2006a) were the first to measure the impact of fore-
closures on nearby property values. Using hedonic regression and data from Chi-
cago in the late 1990s, they found that foreclosures were associated with lower 
property values of nearby homes, even after controlling for a wide variety of other 
demographic and property characteristics, including home values in the larger 
surrounding neighborhood. Each additional foreclosure within an eighth of a 
mile of a property was associated with a decline in value of 1–1.5 percent. This 
study was widely cited in efforts to develop policies to respond to the foreclosure 
crisis and demonstrates the spillover effects of foreclosures on neighbors.
In the wake of the crisis, many researchers expanded on the methods and 
data of this study to examine foreclosure’s effects on nearby property values, espe-
cially beginning in the mid-2000s. For example, Hartley (2011) examined fore-
closures in Chicago over a longer period, from 1999 to 2008, and found that in 
high-vacancy census tracts, the effect of a foreclosure on property values within 
250 feet was approximately −2 percent, while the effect in low-vacancy tracts was 
smaller. These findings were roughly consistent with those of Immergluck and 
Smith (2006a).
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In another study, based on data from 1987 to 2008 in the state of Massa-
chusetts, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) found that a foreclosure within 
0.05 mile lowered the price of a house by approximately 1 percent. Mikelbank 
(2008) found negative effects of foreclosures on housing values in his analysis of 
2006 sales in Columbus, Ohio, but he also found that vacant homes had an even 
stronger negative effect on prices than nonvacant foreclosures. Harding, Rosen-
blatt, and Yao (2009) analyzed foreclosures and property sales in seven metro-
politan areas from 1989 to 2007 using a repeat sales analysis, which controls 
for neighborhood conditions. They found that each foreclosure within 300 feet 
of a property had a −1 percent effect on the property’s value and that the effect 
reached its peak at the time of the foreclosure sale.
In New York City, using data from 2000 to 2005, Schuetz, Been, and Ellen 
(2008) found that the effect of foreclosures on home prices was nonlinear, mean-
ing that there was little or no effect until a certain threshold number of fore-
closures was reached, after which the effect became more sizable. This finding 
suggests a sort of quadratic relationship between foreclosures and values, where 
additional foreclosures result in increasingly large (in magnitude) negative spill-
overs. (It should be noted that there was not really a foreclosure crisis in New 
York City during this period.)
Some studies, including Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader (2011), have 
found nonlinearities in the other direction, meaning that saturation is reached at 
some point, after which additional foreclosures appear to have little impact on 
the magnitude of the (negative) spillover. More particularly, in that study, which 
looked at data from 2008 and 2009 in Las Vegas, the authors found that the first 
couple of foreclosures within one-half mile of a property had no impact on its 
value. After that, the effect increased, up to about 20 foreclosures, after which 
it stayed relatively flat or even declined slightly. The authors identified a linear 
rate of increase up to a cumulative effect of about an 8 percent negative spillover 
(within three months of the foreclosure). After 20 foreclosures, a saturation point 
was reached.
Other researchers also have identified saturation points. For example, in a 
study of home sales in the Nashville area from 2001 to 2012, Huang et al. (2014) 
found steep reductions in values as neighborhood foreclosure rates increased. 
Such increases reached an inflection point as the foreclosure rate reached 1 per-
cent, at which the cumulative negative spillover effect reached a maximum mag-
nitude of approximately $12,000. It may be that the study by Schuetz, Been, and 
Ellen (2008) did not detect a saturation point because foreclosures did not reach 
high levels in the city during the study period, which predated the peak of the 
foreclosure problem there.
An exhaustive catalog of the dozens of studies measuring the effects of fore-
closures on home values is beyond the scope of this chapter. Moreover, any effort 
to definitively summarize the magnitude of these effects would be extremely dif-
ficult because the studies varied widely across a number of parameters, such as 
those outlined in the following list.
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1. The locations and conditions of the housing markets varied greatly. Vari-
ations in housing markets would be expected to affect the severity of foreclosure 
effects on values. Most of the studies, due largely to data availability, focused on 
just one city or metropolitan area. Some studies attempted to analyze data in sev-
eral metropolitan areas, but this was further complicated by varying legal defini-
tions of foreclosure from state to state and even sometimes across county or local 
boundaries.
2. The morphology and density of the cities studied varied greatly. For ex-
ample, Chicago is four times as dense as Atlanta (with density defined as hous-
ing units per acre). A buffer of a half mile around a house in Chicago, therefore, 
would be likely to capture many more adjacent homes, and potential foreclo-
sures, as the same buffer would in Atlanta.
3.	Foreclosure can mean many things, and the detectable events involved in 
the default and foreclosure process depend on state legal prescriptions and how 
data are reported or collected. In some states, formal foreclosure filings are re-
quired at the beginning of the process, while in other states a simple newspaper 
notice suffices. Some of the studies focused on foreclosure notices or filings, while 
others examined properties sold at foreclosure auctions or those either entering 
or already in REO status. Some studies attempted to disentangle the effects of dif-
ferent stages of the foreclosure process, and some even attempted to measure the 
effects of foreclosure alternatives, especially short sales.
4. The studies used different geographic buffers in calculating the incidence 
of nearby foreclosure activity. Most of them employed simple circular radial buff-
ers, but some used other techniques, including the face-block concept, which es-
sentially means examining the effects of foreclosures on the same street or across 
the street, but not on nearby streets.
5. Some studies measured both distance- and time-based decays in effects, 
and the trigger points for measuring time decays varied.
6. Some studies measured nonlinearities in the cumulative effects of multiple 
foreclosures, while others did not.
7. The studies used different models, econometric techniques, and sources of 
data. Among the models used were standard hedonic ordinary least squares, repeat- 
sales, and panel models. Some of the studies controlled for spatial autocorrelation, 
and others did not. Data sources varied, including local public records, Multiple 
Listing Service (MLS) data, and vendor-provided data, which might in turn be 
based on public records, loan servicing data, or other sources. Although research 
in mortgage and housing markets increasingly has relied on vendor-provided 
data, the quality of such data is largely unexplored.
Despite the heterogeneity of the data and methods, the literature as a whole is 
remarkably consistent in one finding: foreclosures have a statistically significant 
and economically meaningful negative effect on nearby property values. In his 
review of an early subset of the literature, Frame (2010) concluded that foreclo-
sures do indeed have a negative impact on nearby property values, with the effect 
declining over time and space.
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The magnitude of all these effects varies widely, as do the metrics used in 
the studies. Moreover, it is very difficult to tell whether this variation is due to 
measuring effects—in different cities, at different points in time (e.g., before or 
after 2007–2008), at different points in the foreclosure process, or using funda-
mentally different econometric specifications or techniques—or to some other 
difference among the studies.
A closely related set of studies have focused on the issue of foreclosure	con-
tagion—that is, do more foreclosures in an area, independent of other housing 
market forces, lead homeowners in that area or in nearby areas to default and/or 
enter foreclosure? If foreclosures lead to lower nearby home values, one might 
expect the answer to be yes, especially since declining home values can make 
households more vulnerable to foreclosure (if they encounter financial hardships, 
they will find it more difficult to sell or refinance their homes). While fewer stud-
ies have addressed this issue than the price impact issue, those that have done so 
have generally found evidence of foreclosure contagion.
Munroe and Wilse-Samson (2013) examined Chicago real estate records for 
2002–2011 and found that a completed foreclosure, compared with the dismissal 
of a foreclosure case, raised the probability of a new foreclosure filing within 
0.1 mile by 10 percent per year. This amounted to about 0.5 new filings per year. 
Moreover, they found that this effect lasted three to four years. They also found 
that contagion led to more completed foreclosures in nearby areas. Li (2013) 
used MLS data from 2005–2009 for the city of Milwaukee and found that, other 
things being equal, nearby foreclosure activity positively affected the probability 
that a homeowner would enter foreclosure. Moreover, Li showed that the magni-
tude of this contagion declined over time and distance. For example, a foreclo-
sure occurring within the previous three to six months and within 200 meters of 
a house increased the probability of foreclosure on that house by just over 3 per-
cent. However, a foreclosure farther away—between 500 and 1,000 meters—in-
creased this probability by only 1 percent. If the foreclosure had occurred a year 
or two before, the effect on the probability of foreclosure was even smaller. Thus, 
a declining effect over time and space was detected.
Goodstein et al. (2011) analyzed nationwide data from the mortgage data 
provider Lender Processing Services and found that the likelihood of a mort-
gage default increased by 0.03 percent in response to a 1 percent increase in the 
foreclosure rate in zip codes within five miles. This result is not trivial. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in the foreclosure rate of the surrounding area would in-
crease the likelihood of mortgage default by as much as 24 percent. The authors 
controlled for county-level demographic changes and zip-code-level changes in 
home prices.
ForecLosure and crime
Research has found a connection between foreclosure and crime. Homes left va-
cant for protracted periods can become sites of criminal activity. The earliest study 
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on the link between foreclosure and crime was done in Chicago in 1999–2001. 
The study found that higher foreclosure levels in Chicago neighborhoods were 
associated with higher levels of violent crime, even after controlling for a large 
number of other neighborhood characteristics (Immergluck and Smith 2006b). 
A number of other studies have reported consistent results. Stucky, Ottensmann, 
and Payton (2012) observed that foreclosures in Indianapolis during the middle-
to-late 2000s were associated with an increase in neighborhood crime rates (both 
property crimes and violent crimes). Teasdale, Clark, and Hinkle (2012) found 
similar results in Akron.
In general, studies using fine-grained data at the neighborhood scale—many 
with better data sets and more sophisticated methods than the earliest studies—
have found that foreclosure leads to increased crime, although some of these find-
ings vary in their details. In a study of New York City between 2004 and 2008, 
Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin (2013) concluded that foreclosures on a particular 
block led to more total crimes on that block, with the largest increase being in 
violent crimes. Cui (2010) analyzed crime and foreclosure data in Pittsburgh 
and found that violent crimes within 250 feet of a foreclosed home increased by 
more than 15 percent once the home became vacant; similar increases in prop-
erty crimes occurred. Cui also found that longer versus shorter vacancy periods 
had larger effects on crime. Williams, Galster, and Verma (2014) used data from 
Chicago for the years 1998–2009 to disentangle the potential reverse causality 
between foreclosure and crime. They found that property crime chronologically 
lags completed foreclosures and not vice versa, adding support to the notion that 
foreclosure causes crime and is not simply correlated with it for other reasons. 
Some studies have not attempted to estimate the specific effect of foreclosure on 
crime but have found an effect of vacancy on crime, and some vacancies are likely 
associated with foreclosures. Branas, Rubin, and Guo (2012), for example, found 
that vacant property was among the strongest predictors of assault when tested 
along with a dozen demographic and socioeconomic variables.
Other studies have attempted to measure the effect of foreclosure on crime at 
somewhat larger geographic levels, such as counties. However, these studies have 
often suffered from the fact that crime varies tremendously at very small geo-
graphic levels, much of which will not be picked up at the larger geographic scale. 
Some of them have also faced challenges in developing accurate and unbiased 
measures of foreclosure rates across different geographies and jurisdictions.2
2. An example is Arnio, Baumer, and Wolff (2012), who used counties as the geographic unit of 
analysis and employed a foreclosure rate in which the denominator was the number of housing 
units in the county. The denominator is problematic because it can severely overestimate the 
number of one- to four-unit properties on which there could be a mortgage in counties where 
there are many multifamily rental housing units. This problem creates a systematic bias in the 
measure of foreclosure rates across and within different metropolitan areas.
224	 Dan	Immergluck
ForecLosure and FiscaL stress
Foreclosures and associated vacancies may entail a variety of fiscal costs to local 
governments. These include the following:
Increased policing due to vandalism and other crimes.
An increased burden on the fire department due to arson.
Costs of boarding up and demolishing buildings.
Costs of removing trash and mowing lawns.
Costs of managing the foreclosure process, including record keeping and 
legal expenses.
Lost property tax revenue if the building owner stops paying taxes.
Lost property tax revenue due to declining values of nearby properties.
Lost economic development benefits due to decreased desirability of the 
community for commercial/industrial development.
In a study of Chicago before the mortgage crisis of the early 2000s, Apgar 
and Duda (2005) found that direct costs to city government sometimes exceeded 
$30,000 per foreclosure. More recent anecdotal evidence supports the high costs 
of foreclosure and related vacancy. Chicago officials estimated that it cost almost 
$900,000 to board up and secure just over 600 properties (U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office 2011). Meanwhile, a study of Baltimore estimated that each 
vacant property increased annual police and fire expenditures by almost $1,500 
(Winthrop and Herr 2009).
On the revenue side, the fall in housing prices, often spurred or accelerated 
by foreclosures, led to a decline in property tax revenues in many cities during the 
late 2000s. Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky (2011) concluded that in cities hit 
hard by the foreclosure crisis, lower property values would lead to major declines 
in property tax revenues. In Las Vegas, for example, they estimated a 22 percent 
drop in revenues, while in Modesto and Stockton, California, their estimates 
were in the range of 24–25 percent.
Conclusions   
The research detailed in this chapter focused on the relatively near-term impacts 
of foreclosure on households and neighborhoods. The literature generally shows 
that foreclosure resulted in negative, nontrivial effects on household financial 
conditions, health, and schooling, among other important variables. The research 
on foreclosure contagion and the effects of foreclosure on nearby property values 
was unequivocal in that almost all the studies found nontrivial negative impacts 
resulting from foreclosure. The robustness of the methods and the geographic di-
versity of the studies suggest that these effects were usually economically substan-
tial. However, the heterogeneity in the data, methods, and geographic locations 
employed makes it very difficult to develop any sort of statistics that would ac-
curately capture any central tendency of the magnitude of these effects. In terms 
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of the effects of foreclosure on crime, the stronger studies that used sound mea-
sures of foreclosure activity at small geographic levels tended to find material im-
pacts of foreclosure on crime, or in some cases regression-adjusted associations. 
However, this research was not quite as large or robust as the property value 
literature.
This chapter did not explore research that has examined the longer-term 
effects or trajectories of foreclosure, including the purchase of properties by in-
vestors, the conversion of properties from owner-occupied to rental uses, or the 
redevelopment of properties using subsidies such as the federal Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program. Examples of this research include Immergluck and Law 
(2013) and Pfeiffer and Molina (2013). Another related area of inquiry that has 
received little attention is the longer-term impacts of the foreclosure crisis on hous-
ing tenure in areas where investors may have converted many owner-occupied 
homes to rental properties. To the extent that some neighborhoods may have 
seen rapid declines in owner occupancy rates, especially in areas that had rela-
tively high home ownership rates before the crisis, the effects of the crisis could 
be significant. Moreover, the receptiveness of such neighborhoods to the conver-
sion of owner-occupied single-family homes to rental properties—including the 
potential fair housing implications—deserves more scrutiny.
In terms of policy implications, some lessons are generally clear. Foreclo-
sure imposes sizable negative costs on individuals, families, and neighborhoods. 
Many of these costs affect those not involved in the mortgage transaction. When 
attempting to reform mortgage markets and adopt new regulations, policy mak-
ers must consider the damage done by reckless or overly aggressive mortgage 
lending practices. Many of the policy initiatives thus far have been federally regu-
lated and focused on protecting consumers. These are worthy efforts, but the 
spatial implications of concentrated risky lending and the associated foreclosures 
suggest that local and state governments have a stake in this reform effort, too. 
Fortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, by limiting the preemption of state 
mortgage regulations, allows states to retain the ability to regulate markets if 
they view federal efforts as insufficient. Given the costs to localities and neighbor-
hoods reported here, this is appropriate.
In addition, federal efforts to reform mortgage markets that relied too heavily 
on privatization may result in new boom-bust markets and more risk-based pric-
ing—possibly at the neighborhood level. Replacing the cross-subsidization that 
occurred in the traditional government-sponsored secondary markets with much 
higher levels of risk-based pricing and a resurgence of high-risk lenders may am-
plify the tendency toward neighborhood-level housing market volatility and ex-
acerbate the spillover effects of default and foreclosure. Under such a system, as 
foreclosures increased and values fell, lenders would be likely to charge substan-
tially higher rates in the most heavily impacted neighborhoods, fostering another 
downward spiral. A more uniform and less segmented mortgage market, with 
less severe risk-based pricing, should dampen the effects of mortgage distress 
in neighborhoods experiencing foreclosures, mitigating against vicious cycles. In 
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addition to encouraging cross-subsidization and broader, less specialized second-
ary markets, federal (and state) agencies should aggressively enforce the Fair 
Housing Act to minimize excessive mortgage pricing disparities, which could 
exacerbate spatial contagion of housing market problems and negative spillovers 
into the mortgage and housing markets.
State and local governments also have a role to play. They need the tools to 
intervene in property markets at the earliest signs of mortgage and housing dis-
tress, both to stem the tide of foreclosures and to mitigate against the blight and 
vacancy that can accompany them. These tools might include the ability to assem-
ble and redevelop or demolish distressed properties that harm nearby homes and 
entire neighborhoods.3 It is much more difficult to address these sorts of problems 
after they have reached crisis proportions, as they did in many neighborhoods 
in 2008 and 2009.
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